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Abstract—Information-theoretic security—widely accepted as
the strictest notion of security—relies on channel coding tech-
niques that exploit the inherent randomness of propagation chan-
nels to strengthen the security of communications systems. Within
this paradigm, we explore strategies to improve secure connectivity
in a wireless network. We first consider the intrinsically secure
communications graph (iS-graph), a convenient representation
of the links that can be established with information-theoretic
security on a large-scale network. We then propose and charac-
terize two techniques—sectorized transmission and eavesdropper
neutralization—which are shown to dramatically enhance the
connectivity of the iS-graph.
Index Terms—Physical-layer security, wireless networks, secure
connectivity, stochastic geometry, random graphs, node degree.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication is particularly susceptible to eaves-
dropping due to the broadcast nature of the transmission
medium. In current systems, security is addressed above the
physical layer using cryptographic protocols (e.g., RSA and
AES), which assume that an error-free physical link has already
been established. In contrast with this paradigm, it is possible
to take advantage of physical-layer techniques to significantly
strengthen the security of communication systems. This is
the basic principle of information-theoretic security, widely
accepted as the strictest notion of security.1 It relies on channel
coding techniques that exploit the inherent randomness of
propagation channels to ensure that the transmitted messages
cannot be decoded by a malicious eavesdropper.
The basis for information-theoretic security, which builds on
the notion of perfect secrecy [1], was laid in [2] and later
in [3], [4]. More recently, there has been a renewed interest
in information-theoretic security over wireless channels, from
the perspective of space-time communications [5], multiple-
input multiple-output communications [6]–[10], eavesdropper
collusion [11], [12], cooperative relay networks [13], fading
channels [14]–[18], strong secrecy [19], [20], secret key agree-
ment [21]–[25], code design [26]–[28], among other topics. A
fundamental limitation of this literature is that it only considers
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1Information-theoretic security is also known as physical-layer security, or
intrinsic security. In the literature, the term “security” typically encompasses
three different characteristics: secrecy (or privacy), integrity, and authenticity.
We do not consider the issues of integrity or authenticity, and use the terms
“secrecy” and “security” interchangeably.
scenarios with a small number of nodes. To account for large-
scale networks composed of multiple legitimate and eaves-
dropper nodes, secrecy graphs were introduced in [29] from
a geometrical perspective, and in [30] from an information-
theoretic perspective. The local connectivity of secrecy graphs
was extensively characterized in [31], while the scaling laws of
the secrecy capacity were presented in [32], [33]. The feasibility
of long-range secure communication was proved in [34], in the
context of continuum percolation.
In this paper, we explore strategies to improve secure
connectivity in a wireless network. We first consider the in-
trinsically secure communications graph (iS-graph)—a con-
venient representation of the links that can be established
with information-theoretic security on a large network. We
then propose two techniques for improving the connectivity of
the iS-graph: (i) sectorized transmission, whereby each legit-
imate node transmits independently in multiple sectors of the
plane (e.g., using directional antennas); and (ii) eavesdropper
neutralization, whereby each legitimate node guarantees the
absence of eavesdroppers in a surrounding region (e.g., by
deactivating such eavesdroppers). We quantify and compare
the effectiveness of the proposed techniques in terms of the
resulting average node degree.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the
system model. Section III proposes and compares techniques
for enhancing the secrecy of communication. Section IV pro-
vides some numerical results. Section V summarizes important
findings.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Wireless Propagation
Given a transmitter node xi ∈ Rd and a receiver node xj ∈
R
d
, we model the received power Prx(xi, xj) associated with
the wireless link −−→xixj as
Prx(xi, xj) = P · g(xi, xj),
where P is the transmit power, and g(xi, xj) is the power
gain of the link −−→xixj . The gain g(xi, xj) is considered con-
stant (quasi-static) throughout the use of the communications
channel, corresponding to channels with a large coherence time.
Furthermore, the function g is assumed to satisfy the following
conditions, which are typically observed in practice: i) g(xi, xj)
depends on xi and xj only through the link length |xi − xj |;2
ii) g(r) is continuous and strictly decreasing with r; and
iii) limr→∞ g(r) = 0.
B. iS-Graph
Consider a wireless network where the legitimate nodes
and the potential eavesdroppers are randomly scattered in
2With abuse of notation, we write g(r) , g(xi, xj)||xi−xj |→r .
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Figure 1. Example of an iS-graph on R2.
space, according to some point processes. The iS-graph is a
convenient representation of the links that can be established
with information-theoretic security on such a network.
Definition 2.1 (iS-Graph [31]): Let Πℓ = {xi}∞i=1 ⊂ Rd
denote the set of legitimate nodes, and Πe = {ei}∞i=1 ⊂ Rd
denote the set of eavesdroppers. The iS-graph is the directed
graph G = {Πℓ, E} with vertex set Πℓ and edge set
E = {−−→xixj : Rs(xi, xj) > ̺}, (1)
where ̺ is a threshold representing the prescribed infimum
secrecy rate for each communication link; and Rs(xi, xj) is
the maximum secrecy rate (MSR) of the link −−→xixj , given by
Rs(xi, xj) =
[
log2
(
1 +
Prx(xi, xj)
σ2ℓ
)
− log2
(
1 +
Prx(xi, e
∗)
σ2e
)]+
in bits per complex dimension, where [x]+ = max{x, 0};
σ2ℓ , σ
2
e are the noise powers of the legitimate users and eaves-
droppers, respectively; and e∗ = argmax
ek∈Πe
Prx(xi, ek).
3
The above definition admits an outage interpretation, in the
sense that legitimate nodes set a target secrecy rate ̺ at which
they transmit without knowing the channel state information
(CSI) of the legitimate nodes and eavesdroppers. In this context,
an edge between two nodes in the iS-graph signifies that the
corresponding channel is not in secrecy outage.
In the remainder of the paper, we consider the particular
scenario where the following conditions hold: (a) the noise
powers of the legitimate users and eavesdroppers are equal,
i.e., σ2ℓ = σ2e = σ2; and (b) the infimum desired secrecy rate
is zero, i.e., ̺ = 0.4 Under these special conditions, the edge
set in (1) simplifies to
E =
{
−−→xixj : |xi − xj | < |xi − e
∗|, e∗ = argmin
ek∈Πe
|xi − ek|
}
,
which corresponds to the geometrical model proposed in [29].
Fig. 1 shows an example of such an iS-graph on R2.
The spatial location of the legitimate and eavesdropper nodes
can be modeled either deterministically or stochastically. In
many cases, the node positions are unknown to the network
designer a priori, so they may be treated as uniformly random
according to a Poisson point process [35], [36].
3This definition uses strong secrecy as the condition for information-theoretic
security. See [19], [31, Sec. II-B] for more details.
4Note that by setting ̺ = 0 we are considering the existence of secure links,
in the sense that an edge −−→xixj is present iff Rs(xi, xj) > 0. The general case
of non-zero secrecy rate threshold, ̺ > 0, and unequal noise powers, σ2
ℓ
6= σ2e ,
can still be considered (see [31, Sec. III-E] for an analysis) but does not provide
as many insights.
Definition 2.2 (Poisson iS-Graph): The Poisson iS-graph
is an iS-graph where Πℓ,Πe ⊂ Rd are mutually independent,
homogeneous Poisson point processes with densities λℓ and λe,
respectively.
In the remainder of the paper (unless otherwise indicated),
we focus on Poisson iS-graphs on R2.
III. TECHNIQUES FOR ENHANCED SECURE
COMMUNICATION
In this section, we first characterize the connectivity of the
iS-graph without any enhancement (as introduced in Defi-
nition 2.1), and then propose two techniques for improving
secure connectivity: sectorized transmission and eavesdropper
neutralization. For each strategy, we characterize the average
node degree of a typical node in the corresponding enhanced
iS-graph.5 The average degree is a measure of secure connec-
tivity, and is used in this paper to quantify and compare the
effectiveness of each strategy.
A. Secure Communication Without Enhancement
We start by characterizing secure connectivity in the
iS-graph when no particular strategy is used.
Theorem 3.1 (No Enhancement): The out-degree Nout of a
typical node in the Poisson iS-graph has the following geo-
metric probability mass function (PMF)
pNout(n) =
(
λℓ
λℓ + λe
)n(
λe
λℓ + λe
)
, n ≥ 0. (2)
In particular, the average node degrees are given by
E{Nout} = E{Nin} =
λℓ
λe
. (3)
Proof: See [29], [30].
We observe that in the iS-graph without enhancement, even a
small density of eavesdroppers is enough to significantly disrupt
connectivity. For example, if the density of eavesdroppers is
half the density of legitimate nodes, then the average node
degree is only λℓ
λe
= 2. In what follows, we propose techniques
that achieve an average degree higher than λℓ
λe
.
B. Secure Communication With Sectorized Transmission
We have so far assumed that the legitimate nodes employ
omnidirectional antennas, distributing power equally among all
directions in space. We now let each legitimate node transmit
independently in L sectors of the plane, with L ≥ 1. This can
be accomplished, for example, through the use of L directional
antennas. Our goal is to characterize the impact of the number
of sectors L on the local connectivity of the resulting iS-graph.
With each node xi ∈ Πℓ, we associate L transmission
sectors {S(l)i }
L
l=1 , defined as
S
(l)
i ,
{
z ∈ R2 : φi + (l − 1)
2π
L
< ∠−→xiz < φi + l
2π
L
}
5We analyze the properties of a typical node, a notion which is made precise
in [37, Sec. 4.4] using Palm theory. Specifically, Slivnyak’s theorem states that
the properties observed by a typical legitimate node x ∈ Πℓ are the same as
those observed by node 0 in the process Πℓ ∪ {0}. Informally, a typical node
of Πℓ is one that is uniformly picked from a finite region expanding to R2.
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Figure 2. Secure communication with sectorized transmission. In this example
with L = 4 sectors, the node at the origin can transmit messages with
information-theoretic security to Nout = 5 nodes.
for l = 1 . . . L, where {φi}∞i=1 are random offset angles with
an arbitrary joint distribution. The resulting iS-graph with
sectorization, GL = {Πℓ, EL}, has an edge set given by
EL = {
−−→xixj : |xi − xj | < |xi − e
∗|},
where
e∗ = argmin
ek∈Πe∩S∗
|xi − ek|, S
∗ =
{
S
(l)
i : xj ∈ S
(l)
i
}
.
Here, S∗ is the transmission sector of xi that contains the
destination node xj , and e∗ is the eavesdropper inside S∗ that
is closest to the transmitter xi. Then, the secure link −−→xixj exists
if and only if xj is closer to xi than any other eavesdropper
inside the same transmission sector where the destination xj is
located. The following theorem characterizes the distribution
of the out-degree.
Theorem 3.2 (Sectorized Transmission): For the enhanced
Poisson iS-graph GL with L sectors, the out-degree Nout of a
typical node has the following negative binomial PMF
pNout(n) =
(
L+ n− 1
L− 1
)(
λℓ
λℓ + λe
)n(
λe
λℓ + λe
)L
(4)
for n ≥ 0. In particular, the average node degrees are given by
E{Nout} = E{Nin} = L
λℓ
λe
. (5)
Proof: We consider the process Πℓ ∪ {0} obtained by
adding a legitimate node to the origin of the coordinate system,
and denote the out-degree of node 0 by Nout, as depicted
in Fig. 2. Let S(l) denote the l-th sector of node 0, where
we omitted the subscript 0 for simplicity. Let {R(l)ℓ,i}∞i=1 be
the distances—not necessarily ordered—between the origin
and the legitimate nodes falling inside S(l) (we similarly
define {R(l)e,i}∞i=1 for the eavesdroppers falling inside S(l)).
Then, Nout =
∑L
l=1N
(l)
out, where N
(l)
out , #{R
(l)
ℓ,i : R
(l)
ℓ,i <
mink R
(l)
e,k} is the out-degree of node 0 associated with sec-
tor l. Furthermore, the random variables (RVs) {N (l)out} are
independent identically distributed (IID) for different l.6 To
6This is because the sectors {S(l)}L
l=1 correspond to an equipartition of
R2, and the processes Πℓ,Πe are homogeneous Poisson.
determine the PMF of N (l)out, we use the fact that {(R
(l)
ℓ,i)
2}∞i=1
and {(R(l)e,i)2}∞i=1 are homogeneous Poisson processes with
rates πλℓ
L
and πλe
L
, respectively (by the mapping theorem [35,
Sec. 2.3]). Following steps analogous to the proof of [30, Thm.
3.1], it is easy to show that N (l)out has a geometric PMF given
by p
N
(l)
out
(n) = pn(1 − p), n ≥ 0, with p = λℓ
λℓ+λe
. Now,
since the RVs {N (l)out} are IID in l, the total out-degree Nout
has a negative binomial PMF with L degrees of freedom and
the same parameter p, i.e., pNout(n) =
(
L+n−1
L−1
)
pn(1 − p)L,
n ≥ 0, with p = λℓ
λℓ+λe
. This is the result in (4), from which
(5) follows trivially.
We conclude that the average node degree increases linearly
with the number of sectors L, and hence sectorized transmission
is an effective technique for enhancing the secrecy of commu-
nications. Figure 2 provides an intuitive understanding of why
sectorization works. Specifically, if there was no sectorization,
node 0 would be out-isolated, due to the close proximity
of the eavesdropper in sector S(4). However, if we allow
independent transmissions in four non-overlapping sectors, that
same eavesdropper can only hear the transmissions inside
sector S(4). Thus, even though node 0 is out-isolated with
respect to sector S(4), it may still communicate securely with
some legitimate nodes inside sectors S(1), S(2), and S(3).
Lastly, note that for L = 1 (i.e., no enhancement), Theorem 3.2
reduces to Theorem 3.1 as expected.
C. Secure Communication With Eavesdropper Neutralization
In some scenarios, each legitimate node may be able to
physically inspect its surroundings and deactivate the eaves-
droppers falling inside some neutralization region. Our goal
is to characterize the impact of such region on the local
connectivity of the resulting iS-graph.
With each node xi ∈ Πℓ, we associate a neutralization
region Θi inside which all eavesdroppers have been deactivated.
The total neutralization region Θ can then be seen as a Boolean
model with points {xi} and associated sets {Θi}, i.e., [37]
Θ =
∞⋃
i=1
(xi +Θi).
Since the eavesdroppers inside Θ have been deactivated, the
effective eavesdropper process after neutralization is Πe ∩ Θ,
where Θ , R2\Θ denotes the complement of Θ. The resulting
iS-graph with neutralization, GΘ = {Πℓ, EΘ}, has an edge set
given by
EΘ =
{
−−→xixj : |xi−xj | < |xi− e
∗|, e∗ = argmin
ek∈Πe∩Θ
|xi− ek|
}
i.e., the secure link −−→xixj exists if and only if xj is closer to xi
than any other eavesdropper that has not been neutralized. In
the following, we consider the case of a circular neutralization
set, i.e, Θi = B0(ρ), where ρ is a deterministic neutralization
radius, and denote the corresponding graph by Gρ.7
Theorem 3.3 (Eavesdropper Neutralization): For the
enhanced Poisson iS-graph Gρ with neutralization radius ρ,
7We use Bx(ρ) , {y ∈ R2 : |y − x| ≤ ρ} to denote the closed two-
dimensional ball centered at point x, with radius ρ.
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Figure 3. Secure communication with eavesdropper neutralization. In this
example, the node at the origin can transmit messages with information-
theoretic security to Nout = 5 nodes.
the average node degrees of a typical node are lower-bounded
by
E{Nout} = E{Nin} ≥
λℓ
λe
(
πλeρ
2 + eπλℓρ
2
)
. (6)
Proof: We consider the process Πℓ ∪ {0} obtained by
adding a legitimate node to the origin of the coordinate system,
and denote the out-degree of node 0 by Nout, as depicted in
Fig. 3. Let Re,1 , minek∈Πe∩Θ |ek| be the random distance
between the first non-neutralized eavesdropper and the origin.
Noting that
Nout =
∑
xi∈Πℓ
1{|xi| < Re,1} =
∫∫
R2
1{|x| < Re,1}Πℓ(dx),
we can use Fubini’s theorem to write
E{Nout} = λℓ
∫∫
R2
Px{|x| < Re,1}dx
= λℓπρ
2 + λℓ
∫∫
D(ρ,∞)
Px{|x| < Re,1}dx, (7)
where D(a, b) , {x ∈ R2 : a ≤ |x| ≤ b} denotes the annulus
centered at the origin, with inner radius a and outer radius b;
and Px{·} is the Palm probability associated with point x
of process Πℓ.8 Appendix A shows that the integrand above
satisfies
Px{|x| < Re,1} ≥ exp
(
−πλee
−λℓπρ
2
(|x|2 − ρ2)
)
. (8)
Replacing (8) into (7), we have
E{Nout} ≥ λℓπρ
2 + λℓ
∫∫
D(ρ,∞)
exp
(
−πλee
−λℓπρ
2
(|x|2−ρ2)
)
dx
= λℓπρ
2 +
λℓ
λe
eλℓπρ
2
.
Rearranging terms and noting that E{Nout} = E{Nin}, we
obtain (6).
8Informally, the Palm probability Px{·} can be interpreted as the conditional
probability P{·|x ∈ Πℓ}. Since the conditioning event has probability zero,
such conditional probability is ambiguous without further explanation. Palm
theory makes this notion mathematically precise (see [37, Sec. 4.4] for a
detailed treatment).
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values of λe (λℓ = 1m−2).
We conclude that the average node degree increases at a
rate that is at least exponential with the neutralization radius ρ,
making eavesdropper neutralization an effective technique for
enhancing the secrecy of communications.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Figure 4 illustrates the effectiveness of eavesdropper neutral-
ization in enhancing secure connectivity. In particular, it plots
the average node degree versus the neutralization radius ρ, for
various values of λe. We observe that the analytical lower-
bound for E{Nout} given in (6) is very close to the actual
value of E{Nout} obtained through Monte Carlo simulation.
The lower-bound becomes tight in the following two extreme
cases:
1) ρ = 0: This corresponds to the case of no enhancement,
so from (3) we have E{Nout} = λℓλe . Since the bound in
(6) also equals λℓ
λe
for ρ = 0, it is tight.
2) λe →∞: In the limit, at least one eavesdropper will fall
almost surely inside the annulus D(ρ, ρ+ ǫ), for any ǫ >
0. As a result, E{Nout} approaches the average number
of legitimate nodes inside the ball B0(ρ), i.e., λℓπρ2.
Since the bound in (6) also approaches λℓπρ2 as λe →
∞, it is asymptotically tight.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed two techniques shown to dra-
matically enhance the connectivity of the iS-graph: sectorized
transmission and eavesdropper neutralization. We proved that
if each legitimate node is able to transmit independently in
L sectors of the plane, the average node degree increases
linearly with L. On the other hand, if each legitimate node
is able to neutralize all eavesdroppers within a radius ρ, the
average degree increases at least exponentially with ρ. We are
hopeful that further efforts will provide an understanding of
how long-range secure communication is improved by the two
proposed strategies. For example, the effect of L and ρ on the
critical densities for continuum percolation is still unknown, as
is their effect on the secrecy capacity scaling laws.
APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF (8)
Because Πℓ is a Poisson process, the Palm probabil-
ity Px{|x| < Re,1} in (7) can be computed using Slivnyak’s
theorem by adding a legitimate node at location x to Πℓ. For
a fixed x ∈ D(ρ,∞), we can thus write
Px{|x| < Re,1} = PΘ,Πe{Πe{Θ ∩D(ρ, |x|)\Bx(ρ)} = 0}
≥ PΘ,Πe{Πe{Θ ∩D(ρ, |x|)} = 0}
= EΘ{exp(−λeA{Θ ∩ D(ρ, |x|)}} (9)
≥ exp(−λeEΘ{A{Θ ∩ D(ρ, |x|)}}), (10)
where A{R} to denotes the area of the arbitrary region R.
Equation (9) follows from conditioning on Θ, and using the
fact that Πe and Θ are independent. Equation (10) follows from
Jensen’s inequality. The term inside the exponential in (10)
corresponds to the average area of a random shape, and can be
computed using Fubini’s theorem as
EΘ{A{Θ ∩D(ρ, |x|)}}
= EΘ
{∫∫
R2
1{y ∈ Θ ∩ D(ρ, |x|)}dy
}
=
∫∫
D(ρ,|x|)
P{y ∈ Θ}dy
=
∫∫
D(ρ,|x|)
P{Πℓ{By(ρ)} = 0}dy
=
∫∫
D(ρ,|x|)
e−λℓπρ
2
dy
= π(|x|2 − ρ2)e−λℓπρ
2
. (11)
Replacing (11) into (10), we obtain the desired inequality in
(8).
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